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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the International 
Hellenic University. 
The influence of the Credit Rating Agencies upgrades and downgrades on debtors’ ability to pay 
back their debt timely and with a manageable default likelihood has been under examination for 
a long time. Our objective in this paper is to examine how the three major Credit Rating Agencies 
- CRAs (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch) affect the bond yields and equity returns in five 
European Union member States (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and France) which were 
identified us unable or in difficulty to refinance their government debt on their own during the 
economic crisis of 2008. Besides we will try to examine the information transfer from the 
aforementioned countries’ rating change to six other countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Netherlands, and UK) which have been specified as stable and trustworthy. More 
specifically, we employed an event study methodology to examine whether the change of a 
country’s credit worthiness delivers new information to market participants in accordance with 
a regression analysis aiming to examine the probability of having an impact in one country’s 
indicators because of the change in the rating of another country. We find that, the downgrades 
of the five countries under examination have a more significant impact compare to the upgrades 
for both the bond and stock markets. The most impactful country of the sample period was 
Greece followed by Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. We conclude that there are evidence of 
specific information transfer among the examined countries.  
Keywords: Credit Rating, European Debt Crisis, Information Transfer, Market Reaction 
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1. Introduction 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There's the United States 
and there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, 
and Moody's can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear 
sometimes who's more powerful. “ 
Thomas Friedman February 13, 1996 
 
Three years after the end of the financial crisis which brought most of the once sovereign 
economies to their knees, this work aims to examine the impact of the Credit Rating Agencies on 
the government bonds, issued by several countries of European Union. Before the description of 
the process of our examination and the analytical section, we believe that it will be useful to 
describe the Credit Rating Agencies’ bond rating process. 
 
1.1 The Bond Rating Process  
 
A debt contract establishes the legal rights and obligations for those who receive financing 
(borrowers) and those who provide it (lenders). Essentially, the borrower promises to repay the 
principal plus the required interest in a stipulated amount of time. However, beyond all legal 
provisions, the contract is compromised once economic considerations are taken into account. 
In the first place, the intrinsic uncertainty surrounding any investment project puts the 
borrower’s ability to repay in question (Ricardo N. Bebczuk, 2005). The information asymmetry 
is a huge issue for any contract counterparty and it had been examined several times in the past. 
As Stiglitz and Weiss claimed back in 1981 the information asymmetry possibly can lead to a non-
efficient distribution of the available financial resources or in an increase of the debt interest rate 
for some borrowers, mainly due to the inability of the lenders to recognize which debtor is 
reliable. According to G. Mattarocci (2014), the borrowing contract counterparties (such as firms, 
The Impact of Credit Rating Changes on European Countries 
 
 
Page 5 / 47 
 
banks, investors, institutional investors and national governments), during their effort to 
overcome the aforementioned problem, can hire qualified information providers to exam the 
different case and produce an objective evaluation of their financial position and trustworthiness. 
Such information providers are the Credit Rating Agencies, which issue a credit opinion (grade) 
based on analysis of financial and qualitative aspects of the issuer or the issue (Nogueira F.A., 
Fonseca M. A., 2013).  This credit ratings reveals a default probability which is expressed via 
upgrades and downgrades of an issuer or debt instrument. If we would like to define better the 
term credit rating we should follow the definitions of the CRAs, themselves.  
The largest three CRAs (in alphabetical order) are Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P), and their definitions of credit ratings are as follows: 
Fitch’s credit rating provide an opinion on the relative ability of an entity to meet financial 
commitments (…) Credit ratings are used by investors as indications of the likelihood of receiving 
the money owed to them in accordance with the terms on which they invested (…) They express 
risk in relative rank order, which is to say they are ordinal measures of credit risk and are not 
predictive of a specific frequency of default or loss.  They do not directly address any risk other 
than credit risk.1 
Ratings assigned on Moody’s global long-term and short-term rating scales are forward-
looking opinions of the relative credit risks of financial obligations issued by non-financial 
corporates, financial institutions, structured finance vehicles, project finance vehicles, and public 
sector entities.2 Since ratings involve judgements about the future, on the one hand, and since 
they are used by investors as a means of protection, on the other, the effort is made when 
assigning ratings to look at "worst" possibilities in the "visible" future, rather than solely at the 
past record and the status of the present. Therefore, investors using the rating should not expect 
                                                          
1 https://www.fitchratings.com : Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion 
2 https://www.moodys.com : Rating Symbols and Definition 
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to find in them a reflection of statistical factors alone, since they are an appraisal of long-term 
risks, including the recognition of many non-statistical factors.3 
A Standard & Poor's credit rating is a forward-looking opinion about the creditworthiness 
of an obligor's overall credit worthiness in order to pay its financial obligations, or the 
creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a specific financial obligation, a specific class of 
financial obligations, or a specific financial program.4 
Whatever the differences are between the three major CRAs, they all agree that a credit 
rating is an opinion about whether the issuer of a fixed income security will pay amounts due on 
time and in full (H. Langohr, , P. Langohr, 2010). 
This work examines the impact of the CRAs announcements on bond yields and equity 
returns for the financial markets of six European countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
France) under deep recession during the period of financial crisis and six European countries 
(Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Netherlands, UK) under slight recession or stability 
during the same period.  
According to the aforementioned definitions, the credit ratings constitutes a significant 
determinant of the borrowers credit quality, therefore we would like to examine the effect of 
the upgrades and downgrades of one country’s creditworthiness to its own bond yields  and 
equity returns. Moreover, since most of the countries we are studying (except of Switzerland) 
are part of one politico-economic union (European Union) within a single – market, which is 
subject to extensively legal, financial, regulatory and economic bonds, and from the time when 
most of them are also part of European union’s monetary union (all the countries under 
examination except of Sweden, UK and Switzerland), we believe that it is academically interesting 
and important to examine the impact of the credit rating change of one country to the others.  
                                                          
3 https://www.moodys.com : Ratings Definitions  
4 Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, Global Credit Portal, Rating Direct  
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This importance arises from the potential correspondence of market participants’ 
reaction or anticipation to the signal of a credit rating change, expressed as a bond yield or equity 
return adjustment. Since the system risk managers and regulators want ratings to be stabilizers 
and this is also an issue examined multiple times, the existence of a statistical significant 
correlation between the credit ratings and the financial instrument could lead us to a 
countercyclical or pro-cyclical role playing of the CRAs which is an important ascertainment. 
Specific interpretation and justification of the methodology used will be broadly subscribed in 
the methodology section of this dissertation.  
During our literature examination we found prior published academic papers, which have 
been focused on the impact of rating announcement on bond and stock markets. We observed 
that the conclusions are mixed. Weinstein (1977) and Wakeman (1978) do not find bond price 
reaction at the time of rating changes. More recent studies, as John R. M. Hand, R. Holthausen & 
R Leftwich (1992) and M. Steiner & V. Heinke (2001) observed overreaction and statistically 
significant abnormal returns during the announcement day of a downgrade and the following 
days. However, they concluded that the upgrades do not cause any significant price change. We 
will investigate this reports during the literature section of the paper.  
Our contribution to the literature is the examination of the credit rating announcements 
as an information transmitter during the whole period of the pre – crisis, during-crisis and after 
– crisis time. Moreover, the fact that the countries which are being tested, are members of the 
European Union (except Switzerland) and they are separated into stable and under recession 
countries help us to examine the credit rating impact of a country under recession on the financial 
stability of another country under recession or even more important to another wealth country. 
Following the methodology of Pantou G. & Spyrou S. (2014) on a different dataset, we are 
trying to respond on two major questions:  
 Firstly, do the credit rating announcements of a country transfer new or additional 
information regarding its credibility to the market participants?  
 Secondly, do the credit rating announcements of a country transfer new or additional 
information regarding other countries credibility to the market participants?  
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The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: in Section 2 we attempt a 
retrospection of the events which captivated the European Union member states into the vortex 
of the unmanageable debt crisis of 2008 – 2012 period; in Section 3 we review the relevant 
literature regarding the thematic of Credit Rating changes’ influence on markets and financial 
instruments; in Section 4 we describe the dataset used during the analytical section; in Section 5 
we elaborate and describe the methodology; in Section 6 we conclude the dissertation.   
 
2. The Retrospection of the Financial Crisis 
We strongly believe that the short retrospection of the financial crisis chronicle combined 
with results of our analysis would be more than helpful to introduce the reader into the 
development procedure of this master thesis.  
 
2.1 The Beginning 
During the three first weeks after Lehman Brothers’ filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection, at September 15th 2008, which was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, with the 
firm holding over $600 billion in assets5, the global economic community was sure that the 
beginning of the late – 2000s global financial - economic crisis had been completed. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the damage caused by the financial crisis of 
2007 – 2009 was estimated up to $14 trillion, thus this estimation could lead us in the deduction 
that the cost may be equal or even greater than the value of one year’s USA output. In particular, 
Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell and Harvey Rosenblum find the crisis cost an estimated $6 trillion 
to $14 trillion (40 to 90 percent of one year’s USA output), the equivalent of $50,000 to $120,000 
for every U.S. household.6 Such a huge economic explosion couldn’t be for any reason an isolated 
incident. 
                                                          
5 "Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt". 
6 Assessing the Costs and Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath 
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A global contagion effect coming from the financial crisis was more than possible, and started 
to be clear since October 2008. The European Commission on October 1st, 2008, put forward a 
proposal in an effort to strengthen the stability of the financial system across the Union. The 
proposal, which was drafted after extensive consultation among the European Commission, 
international partners, industry, and the Member States, amends the existing EU rules on capital 
requirements for banks.  The rules include two Capital Requirements Directives, 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC, whose main objective was to ensure that banks and investment firms were 
financially stable and were efficiently functional. Consistent to the aforementioned proposal, the 
European commission presented, on November 26th, 2008 a financial stimulus recovery plan to 
deal with the plausible problems. According to the communication from the Commission to the 
European Council (Brussels, 26.11.2008 COM (2008) 800 final) titled “A European Economic 
Recovery Plan” there would be two pillars for the financial stimulus: 
 The first pillаr wаs а mаjοr injectiοn οf purchаsing pοwer intο the ecοnοmy, tο bοοst 
demаnd аnd stimulаte cοnfidence. The Cοmmissiοn wаs prοpοsing thаt, аs а mаtter οf 
urgency, Member Stаtes аnd the EU аgreed tο аn immediаte budgetаry impulse 
аmοunting tο € 200 billiοn (1.5% οf GDP), tο bοοst demаnd in full respect οf the Stаbility 
аnd Grοwth Pаct.  
 The secοnd pillаr rested οn the need tο direct shοrt-term аctiοn tο reinfοrce Eurοpe’s 
cοmpetitiveness in the lοng term. The plаn set οut а cοmprehensive prοgrаm tο direct 
аctiοn tο investment in a "smаrt" way to the apropriate skills fοr tοmοrrοw's needs 
(energy efficiency, creаte jοbs, cleаn technοlοgies etc) 
However, soon enough it became clear that the Achilles’ heel of the European Union could 
be two other key issues, the handling of “toxic” or “impaired” assets and the deficits and debt of 
some Eurozone Member States which were remaining on an upward path for years.  
One of the obligations of the Maastricht treaty, for the members, was to keep "sound fiscal 
policies, with debt limited to 60% of GDP and annual deficits no greater than 3%. Having on mind 
both, the January’s European Commission forecast release which estimated a 1.8 per cent decline 
in EU economic output for 2009, and additionally an already publiced claim for a bailout from 10 
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central and east European banks7, on 27 April 2009, Council formally opens excessive deficit 
procedure for Ireland, Greece, Spain and France and issues new recommendation to the UK via 
the publication 8952/09 (Presse 94)8.  
As we can observe in table 1.1 and figure 1.1, the debt on average, both for European Union 
and Euro zone member states was above the benchmark of 60% for many years. The 
aforementioned violation of the treaty was even more observable for the, so called, PIIGS 
(referring to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) countries.  
 
 
Table 2.1 
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Euro area (19 countries) 68.1 68.4 69.2 67.3 64.9 68.5 
EU (27 countries) 60.8 61.3 69.2 60.5 57.9 61.0 
PIIGS 67.6 67.6 61.3 67.5 66.1 73.0 
Years 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Euro area (19 countries) 78.3 83.8 86 89.3 91.1 92.1 
EU (27 countries) 73.1 78.5 81.1 83.8 85.5 86.8 
PIIGS 87.46 100.92 115.72 122.88 129.7 129.58 
 
Notes to Table 1: The indicator is defined (in the Maastricht Treaty) as consolidated general government 
gross debt at nominal (face) value, outstanding at the end of the year in the following categories of 
government liabilities (as defined in ESA2010): currency and deposits, debt securities and loans. The units 
are percentages of each county’s GDP.  
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat9 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 http://www.ft.com : Banks ask for crisis funds for eastern Europe 
8 Council formally opens excessive deficit procedure for Ireland, Greece, Spain and France and issues new 
recommendation to the UK 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat : General government gross debt - annual data 
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Figure 2.1 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 9 
 
2.2 The Downgrades and their Impact 
 
On 22th October, 2009 Fitch, one of the three major credit rating agencies downgrade Greece’s 
credit rating from A to A-. On the same date Eurostat, the statistical directorate-general, did not 
validate and framed a general wariness toward the figures reported by the Greek authorities, 
arising by the significant uncertainties over the figures published10. On Novembers 11th, 2009 the 
European Commission with the publication IP/09/1694, titled “Excessive Deficit Procedure steps: 
the Stability and Growth Pact as the anchor for fiscal exit strategies”, acting as a suggestion to 
the Council which establish 2013 as the closing date for the correction of the budget deficits in 
seven countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Netherlands and 
Portugal). Regarding Greece, Spain, France, Ireland and the UK, the Commission evaluated 
whether "effective action" had been taken. Concerning Greece they concluded that no effective 
action had been taken. For the rest four countries they concluded to revise the existing 
recommendations and therefore to extend the deadlines of the adjustment by one year. On 
                                                          
10 GREECE: Commission assessment in relation to the Commission recommendation for a Council decision  under 
Article 104(8) of the Treaty 
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December 10th, it has been proven that the real government debt had reached 300 billion euros 
- the highest in modern history. Two days before the CRA Fitch downgraded Greece's debt rating 
once again to BBB+, the first time one of the Eurozone countries was getting a moderate credit 
risk grade. 
The major problems identified in the previous paragraph were escalated quickly during the first 
weeks of 2010 creating a generalized incapability for several European Union member states and 
members of Eurozone to repay or refinance their government debt mainly because of the 
institutional and individual lenders asking for ever-higher interest rates from countries with high 
debt and deficit levels. The aforementioned facts can easily be observed also by examining figure 
2.2, which presents the 10 year Government bond yields from 2000 and until the October of 
2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 
10 year Government Bond Yields (2000-2015) 
 
Source: Bloomberg database 
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As we can observe after 2010 the yields of the Greek 10 year bond is starting to escalate 
quickly, by reaching the almost 37% limit of 2011. 
In consequence to the previously stated, the member states had to implement a series of 
fiscal measures in order to reduce the budgetary deficit and public debts, which have peaked in 
the last decades (Bogdan, Daniela, 2014). In general, PIIGS countries, and for some financial 
advisors and journalist even France or/and UK,  used to have (and some of them still)  sovereign 
debt issues which were attributed to a lack of fiscal discipline and a proclivity for external public 
borrowing to maintain a welfare state (Bonitsis, T. H., 2011). Some of these countries turned to 
the EU for financial assistance, but the crisis caught the EU unprepared, without due mechanisms 
to supply the necessary help. At first, temporary new mechanisms were established, like the 
EFSM (European Financial Stability Mechanism) and the EFSF (European Financial Stability 
Facility) which later were replaced by a permanent mechanism: ESM (European Stability 
Mechanism). Moreover, according to Nellie Munin (2014), the financial support of the unstable 
European member states is fundamentally came from three possible resources: the EU resources, 
the individual EU Member States and the international organizations such as, IMF and World 
Bank.  
Greece was the first country which became subject to inability of borrowing from the 
markets, therefore on April 23 of 2010 it formally requested for a loan of 45 billion from the IMF 
to cover the financial necessities for the rest of the 2010. Four days after that claim, the CRA S&P 
downgrade Greece as an issuer by three rating categories (from BBB+ to BB+), and “inaugurate” 
the first time during which one of the Eurozone Countries was put into a speculative grade 
category. Subsequently, more countries followed Greece to the downgrade “spree”.  
Figure 2.3 is indicative of the downgrades during the period 2000-2015 for the PIIGS 
member states and France. Since 2000, until 2006 there were five downgrades, one for Greece, 
one for Portugal and three for Italy. Since 2009 and after the number of downgrades was soared 
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to a high level with the worst year to be clearly 2011 with 28 downgrades including all of the 
PIIGS countries. France started to be downgraded as an issuer since 2012 until today. 
Figure 2.3 
 
 
Notes to Figure 2.3: In that figure the vertical axis presents the number of the downgrades (long term 
issuer credit ratings) during the year presented in the horizontal axis for all of the three major CRA’s. The 
number is unrelated to the number of credit rating categories changed. 
Source: Bloomberg database. 
 
During the period 2000-2015 Greece was the country with the most downgrades, 33 as a 
sum. Portugal follows with 16, Ireland and Spain followed with 15, Italy with 13 and France with 
6. At the same time Greece was also the country with the most upgrades, 15 as a sum. Spain 
follows with 7, Ireland with 6, Portugal with 3 and Italy with 2.  
In table 2.2 we can observe how many categories changed in one credit rating 
announcement from each one of the three major CRAs. There are 105 downgrades and 38 
upgrades. The imbalance in the number of downgrades and upgrades could be explained by 
taking account of the period which was chosen for examination. Most of the times, both for the 
downgrades and upgrades announcement, the category which was changed was just by one. It 
is worth noting that the six categories upgrade was occurred by S&P at 12/18/2012 for Greece 
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creditworthiness, changing the SD (Selective Default) grade which was given at 12/5/2012 to B- . 
"The upgrade reflects our view of the strong determination of European Economic and Monetary 
Union (Eurozone) member states to preserve Greek membership in the Eurozone," S&P stated.11 
In total 143 credit ratings changes by one category happened during the whole examined period, 
with the 81% being happened after 2009.  
 
Table 2.2  
Number of Rating 
Categories Changed Downgrades Upgrades Total 
1 55 27 82 
2 31 8 39 
3 15 0 15 
4 4 1 5 
5 0 1 1 
6 0 1 1 
Total 105 38 143 
 
Notes to Table 2.2: The grading of the rating categories is a variable measure on a scale from 1 (AAA for 
S&P and Fitch, Aaa for Moody’s) to 22 (D for S&P and Fitch, C for Moody’s). The numbers represent the 
changes occurred by all of the three major CRAs during the period 2000-2015. 
Source: Bloomberg database 
 
2.3 Financial Assistance of the Vulnerable Member States 
 
2.3.1 Greece 
The economic regulation project started with the First Adjustment Program for Greece 
which was €107.3 billion given as financial assistance and it was signed on 3 May 2010 by the 
four main authorities of the bailout counterparties (the Greek Government, the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund). Hοwever οnly 
€72.8 billiοn were pаid οut until the Mаrch οf 2012, when it becаme cleаr thаt this is nοt enοugh 
аnd the prοgrаm wаs substituted by the Secοnd Ecοnοmic Аdjustment Prοgrаm fοr Greece 
                                                          
11 http://www.reuters.com : UPDATE 3-S&P upgrades Greece's rating from selective default 
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cοmprising the undisbursed аmοunts οf the first prοgrаm аnd аdditiοnаl €130 billiοn fοr the yeаrs 
2012–14.12   
One of the key conditions was that Greece would reach a deal with its existing private 
sector lenders to reduce its debt, known also as Private Sector Involvement or PSI. This happened 
through a swap of old bonds with newly-issued bonds which could be translated as a nominal 
loss for the private holders of a 53.5% on their Greek debt - which works out to a real loss of 
about 74% after taking into account the loss of future interest payments, and the extra time being 
given to Greece to repay its reduced debts.13 The amount of liabilities erased had a size of €107 
billion, and caused the Greek debt level to fall from roughly 172% of GDP for year 2011 to 160% 
of GDP for year 2012. Currently (2014) the debt of Greece is 178.6% of GDP according to Eurostat. 
Nowadays, the ESM will provide Greece with up to €86 billion in financial assistance over three 
years (availability period ends on 20 August 2018).14 
 
2.3.2 Portugal 
Portugal was one of the first and most vulnerable economies to the financial crisis 
disorder. The first downgrade which was arisen by the S&P during the January of 2009 form AA- 
to A+ was followed by the changes of Portugal’s credibility by Fitch during March of 2010 and 
after that by Moody’s during May of 2010. At 6th of May 2011 the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Union announced a joint financing package worth €78 billion for Portugal, 
aimed at flare up again the growth and the employment.15 On 18 May 2014 Portugal left the EU 
bailout mechanism without additional need for support since it had regained the confidence of 
the investors.16 
 
                                                          
12 http://www.nytimes.com : Europe Agrees on New Bailout to Help Greece Avoid Default 
13 http://www.bbc.com : Q&A: Greek debt swap 
14 http://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/Greece/index.htm 
15 http://www.imf.org : IMF Outlines Joint Support Plan with EU for Portugal 
16 http://www.efsf.europa.eu : Portugal successfully exits EFSF programme  
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2.3.3 Ireland 
During 2010 the financing problem of the Irish Government was more than obvious. The 
solution was a bailout program financed by the EU and IMF, resulting in a €67.5 billion agreement 
of 29 November 2010, which together with €17.5 billion coming from Ireland's own reserves and 
pensions, formed a solution of €85 billion. 17 Moreover, during July of 2011 and September 2011 
European Commission decided to reduce the interest rate of Ireland payments on its EU/IMF 
bailout loan from almost 6% to among 3.5%-4%18  and 2.59%19 respectively, and to increase the 
loan time to 15 years. On December 2013, Ireland left the EU/IMF bailout program, and repaid 
earlier the IMF retained loan.20 
 
2.3.4 Spain  
During June 2012, Spain started to confront a serious financing hurdle since the interest on 
Spain's 10-year bonds touched the 7% making the access to the bond markets impossible. The 
consequence of that was an agreement from Euro zone finance ministers for a credit line of up 
to 100 billion euros in June 2012 for Spanish banks hit by a burst housing bubble.21 On 31 
December 2013, the ESM financial assistance program for Spain expired. The ESM disbursed a 
total of €41.3 billion to the Spanish government for the recapitalization of the country’s banking 
sector.22 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 http://money.cnn.com : EU unveils Irish bailout 
18 http://www.irishcentral.com : Ireland gets more time for bailout repayment and interest rate cut  
19 http://businessetc.thejournal.ie : European Commission reduces margin on Irish bailout to zero 
20 EFSF financial assistance for Ireland ends with successful Irish exit 
21 http://www.reuters.com/Spain receives European bank bailout funds 
22 http://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/spain/ 
The Impact of Credit Rating Changes on European Countries 
 
 
Page 18 / 47 
 
3. Literature Review 
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission "The failures of credit rating agencies 
were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction… This crisis could not have happened 
without the rating agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades through 
2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across markets and firms" All the reports suggest that the role 
played by rating agencies in the structured finance market may have exacerbated the crisis (John 
Ryan, January 2012). 
Hοwever thаt wаsn’t the first time during which the CRАs were chаrged thаt they аre plаying 
а prο-cyclicаl rοle, since there аre signs frοm the Eаst Аsiаn crisis. It cаn be prοved thаt CRАs 
wοrsen the Eаst Аsiаn crisis by deepening the uncertаinty. Аctuаlly, аfter their fаilure tο predict 
the significаnce οf the crisis, the CRАs becаme disprοpοrtiοnаtely cοnservаtive. They 
downgraded East Asian crisis countries more than the undeniable bad economic fundamentals 
of these countries’ would justify. The aforementioned unexpected and insupportable repeated 
downgrades resulted to the increase of abroad borrowing cost and caused the vanishing of the 
international capital supply to them. In turn, lower than deserved ratings contributed - at least 
for some time - to amplify the East Asian crisis (G. Ferri, L.-G. Liu and J. E. Stiglitz, 1999).  
In the summer of 2010, as the fiscal crisis hit Europe, it was argued that the CRAs downgrades 
of the affected countries’ sovereign government debt instruments credibility, like Greece, 
contributed to the deepening of the European debt crisis. European politicians threatened 
retribution, and the creation of a European agency which, presumably, would behave in a more 
obliging manner (Howard Daves, 2010). Regarding the last proposal, it is interesting to underline 
that the reason for the existence of rating agencies in an efficient market is stills to be not clear, 
while Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), among others have shown that it is relatively easy to predict 
rating on the basis of publicly available information. It is also not clear why the bond issuer, rather 
than the user of the rating, pays for the service (Mark Weinstein, 1997). Interestingly, although 
bonds are rated whether the issuer pays for the rating or not, about 98 percent of the issuers 
choose to pay to have their bond rated (…) Perhaps to gain better ratings (…) Alternatively, it has 
been proposed by D. Kliger and O. Sarig, (2000) that by paying for ratings the organizations could 
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be allowed to facilitate inside information to the CRAs assigned ratings without the need to 
disclose specific details to the public at large. However the last statement holds only for the 
private corporations, since the public entities ratings are primarily based on publicly available 
information (such as debt and foreign – reserve levels or political and fiscal constraints. 
Consequently, announced or implemented rating changes will rarely be “uncontaminated” with 
other publicly-available news. Bearing in mind also, that the credit rating industry derives most 
of its fee income from governments which solicit ratings of their bond issues (G. Larrain, H. 
Reisen, J. Maltzan 1997) the question regarding the reason of the excessive willingness for 
government payments holds unanswered. The answer of that question could be partially given, 
by examining the possible correlation between the credit rating announcements and the 
reactions of the bond and stock markets. If there is a statistical significant evidence of that 
correlation then it means that the changes convey additional information to the market 
participants, which is not publicly available.  
It is a fact that a lot of different researchers have approached the wide topic of the credit 
ratings’ impact on the capital markets. Prior research regarding that issue have focused in detail, 
on the effect of the ratings on the stock and bond markets, and to a limited extend on the 
relationship between the sovereign ratings and government bonds, for both primary and 
secondary markets. 
To examine whether the three leading rating agencies do have a market impact, Reisen, H., 
and von Maltzan, J. (1999) undertake an event study which explored the link between press 
releases from the agencies containing rating announcements on sovereign US dollar debt (the 
rating 'event') and movements in sovereign bond yield spreads. The observation period was from 
1989, when emerging market ratings started to gain momentum, to 1997. They collected 152 
rating announcement of which, 26 report actual rating downgrades and 32 actual upgrades. The 
results of the event study methodology could be summarized as it follows; Implement 
downgrades of emerging-market bonds are shown to produce a strongly significant market 
reaction, by increasing the gap of the spreads, on the other hand upgrades create a significant 
spread descent but only during the anticipation period, and not through the actual event days. 
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The sensitivity of the markets’ response is complicated by several considerations. First, to the 
extent that the rating 'event' is anticipated by the market, the subsequent response in yield 
spreads will understate the effect that can be attributed to ratings. Second, both rating 'events' 
and yield spreads may be jointly determined by exogenous shocks: this calls for analysis which 
corrects yield determinants for fundamental factors. 
Further investigation related to that thematic gives additional information regarding the 
existent academic knowledge while until now there is no indisputable results; Klinger and Sarig 
(2000) study, focused on the refinement of Moody’s rating system in 1982, prove that investors 
do react to unanticipated changes in credit ratings, in the same manner as they behave to new 
information. John R. M. Hand, R. Holthausen & R Leftwich (1992), observed asymmetric results 
with respect to rating change downgrades and upgrades. Regarding the announcements they 
observed a negative average excess for both the stock and bond market returns arising mostly 
from the downgrades, with positive but less apparent effects for upgrades. On the other hand, 
one of the major papers regarding the effect of a rating change announcements on bond prices, 
the M. Weinstein (1977) examination, failed to find any effect six months after or six months 
prior of a rating change announcement. Weinstein stated that this is the normal and expected 
outcome since it is consistent to the capital market efficiency and he believes that responsible is 
the well-known predictability of bond rating from publicly available information. Moreover, 
Wakeman (1978) did not find a price reaction explained by the rating changes. 
A recent study of Stancu, I., & Minescu, A. (2011) aimed to assess the impact of sovereign 
ratings on the issuance of government bonds in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
using governments bonds, from 2000-2010, gave us some additional ideas regarding the way we 
have to approach such a complicated topic. The results of their analysis have proved that the 
variation in the initial yield for the government bonds can be explained by using the explanatory 
variables: inflation, sovereign rating at issue date, and crisis dummy for the bonds issued in local 
currencies of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Turkey; and by using only the explanatory 
variables inflation and sovereign rating at issue date for the bonds issued in local currencies of 
United States and European Union. By using R2 as an indicator for how well the model fits to the 
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data, they calculate R2 values between 40% (EUR) to 86% (USD) independently of the rating’s 
direction.  
In general we can conclude that there is significant evident that the market participants react 
both on the announcement and the actual change of the credit rating, however the same doesn’t 
hold for the positive credit rating announcements and the actual changes.  
As we mentioned both in the abstract and introduction we planned our examination on 
two steps, firstly the impact of the country’s rating change to its bond and stock market and 
secondly the spillover effects, influenced by the discussion concerning the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997–98, when sovereign debt problems hopscotched from economy to economy. 
Unfortunately, there has been little research on the spillover effects of rating news.23  
The research objective of Gande and Parsley (2005) is to examine the information transfer 
of the credit rating change signal from one country on the sovereign credit spreads of other 
countries for the period 1991 - 2000. They found strong indication of spillover effects; which 
could be summarized as a significant effect on credit spreads of one country arising by the ratings 
change in another country. This effect is also asymmetric, as we already saw since the positive 
rating events have no noticeable impact on the sovereign spreads, while the negative ratings 
events appears to present a statistical significant correspond of increase in spreads.  
Apropos emerging economies, Kaminski and Schmukler (2002) are the first to examine 
the possibility of the impact of credit ratings not only to the instrument being rated (bonds) but 
also to the stock markets. In addition, they concluded that rating changes directly impact both 
the markets of the countries rated and generate cross-country contagion while it appears that 
the effects of rating and outlook changes producing stronger reflexes during crises, and mainly 
in non-transparent economies, or in bordering countries.  
                                                          
23 http://www.imf.org : Bad News Spreads 
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It is noteworthy that according to Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon, (2010), for more 
unified financial markets, as European Union financial market, the echo from a change in the 
rating for one country, could surpass the bond market by influencing asset classes and financial 
assets of other countries. Contrary to the mainstream literature which was mostly concentrated 
either on different markets within one country, or on one market across different countries their 
findings are important both for the policy makers and the financial advisors regarding 
diversification. 
 
4. Data Set 
This dissertation’s primary dataset consists of daily observations of bond yields, benchmark 
stock market last prices and CRA ratings entirely collected by Bloomberg Database. The sample 
period ranges from January 2000 – October 2015. 
The daily bond yield observations refer to the generic national benchmark 10 – year bonds 
calculated by Bloomberg Database. The countries we are using, in alphabetical order are, Austria, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
UK. 
The daily equity market prices observations refer to the broad stock market indices of the 
previously mentioned countries. The indices we are using are, respectively, ATX Index, CAC Index, 
DAX Index, ASE Index, ISEQ Index, FTSEMIB Index, AEX Index, PSI20 Index, IBEX Index, OMX Index, 
SMI Index and UKX Index. 
Table 4.1 presents the under examination countries’ grades in the first day of the sample 
period and in the last day. According to that table we split the countries into two distinguished 
teams. The countries’ under recession are those which are subjects to more than one change of 
grades. The rest of the countries, which are subject in a change until one grade, are considered 
as stable countries. Regarding France, after an extensive examination, we chose to classify it as a 
recession country basically because of the potential instability arising of the country’s debt crisis. 
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Table 4.1 
 Beginning (1/1/2000) End (23/10/2015) 
Recession Fitch Moody's S&P Fitch Moody's S&P 
France AAA Aaa AAA AA Aa2 AA 
Greece A- A2 A CCC Caa3 CCC+ 
Ireland AAA Aaa AAA A- Baa1 A+ 
Italy AA- Aa3 AA BBB+ Baa2 BBB- 
Portugal AA Aa2 AA BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
Spain AA+ Aaa AA+ BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 
 Beginning (1/1/2000) End (23/10/2015) 
Stable Fitch Moody's S&P Fitch Moody's S&P 
Austria AAA Aaa AAA AA+ Aaa AA+ 
Germany AAA Aaa AAA AAA Aaa AAA 
Netherlands AAA Aaa AAA AAA Aaa AA+ 
Sweden AAA Aaa AAA Aaa AAA AAA 
Switzerland AAA Aaa AAA AAA Aaa AAA 
UK AAA Aaa AAA AA+ Aa1 AAA 
 
Source: Bloomberg database 
 
Regarding the credit ratings we are using local, long term rating changes  starting with a 
set of 177 ratings (105 downgrades, 38 upgrades and 34 zero - grades), announced by Fitch, 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s during the examined period. We exclude all the zero-graded 
announcements and all the credit rating changes who are overlapping, and after the adjustment 
we keep an uncontaminated sample of 123 credit rating changes (90 downgrades and 33 
upgrades).  
For the most of the debt issues and even more for the government ones there is a 
difference between local and foreign currency bonds. However, for the most of the European 
Union countries there not more than a slightly difference between those categories. According 
to S&Ps the foreign and local currency ratings reflect, respectively the obligor’s willingness and 
ability to service commercial financial obligations denominated in foreign or local currency on a 
timely basis. Sovereign local currency ratings can be higher than sovereign foreign currency 
ratings because local – currency creditworthiness may be supported by the unique powers that 
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sovereigns possess within their own borders, including the power to issue in local currency and 
regulatory control of the domestic financial system.24  
Aiming to have a more accurate observation of the regressions’ outflow, the sample is 
split in three different periods, the pre - crisis period (2000-2008), the crisis period (2009-2012) 
and the after - crisis period (2013 -2015). 
 
5. Methodology 
The procedure of the quantitative section has been split in two different aims. The first aim 
is to examine the link among the Credit Rating Agencies’ ratings and the reaction in the bond and 
stock market for the same country. The second aim is to examine the possibility of an impact to 
one country’s bond and stock market, occurred by the credit rating changes of another country’s 
credibility.  
 
5.1 Event Study Methodology 
Our starting point is to examine whether there is an impact of the credit rating change on the 
bond and stock market returns we proceed with an Event Study Methodology. We are beginning 
by processing the time series of the governments’ bond yields and indexes’ last prices. For a 
number of statistical reasons, it is preferable not to work directly with the price series (Chris 
Brooks, 2002), hence we convert prices and yields into series of returns by calculating the daily 
log changes.   
In order to study the mean reaction of the market participants to the credit rating changes 
we are following S. Spyrou and Z. Pantou (2014), by proceeding with two different 
methodologies. First we calculate the mean change in countries’ bond yield and stock index 
return during the downgrades and upgrades events. We are calculating each country’s mean of 
the returns, for the total period and after we are caring out a simple hypothesis test, of the null 
                                                          
24 http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/swf/creditweek/index.html#/28 
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hypothesis that the mean of the county’s (i)25, is equal to the whole sample mean, against the 
two-sided alternative that it is not equal to the whole sample mean.  
Secondly we calculate the Cumulative Return (CRi,t) for the yield and index returns (𝑟𝑡) as it is 
presented by the Kellogg School of Managment26  for t equal to 1,2,3,4,5 and 10 days after each 
rating change : 
𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = [(1 + 𝑟0) ∗ (1 + 𝑟1) ∗ … ∗ (1 + 𝑟𝑁)] − 1 
Next, we calculate each country’s Average Cumulative Return (ACRi):  
𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖 =
1
𝛵
∑𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
 
Note: Where T is the number the credit rating events concerning country (i), which are giving the CRi,t 
results. 
For the estimation of the statistical significance we use the t-statistic: 
𝜏 =
𝐴𝐶𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎/√𝑇
 
Note: Where σ is the standard deviation of the CRi,t and T is the number of credit ratings events concerning 
country (i) which are giving the CRi,t results. 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
The examination of the potential information transfer between the CRAs and the market 
participants of the same country or from other countries require the estimation of the following 
regression: 
𝐷𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐺𝑅,𝑔,𝑡+𝛽3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑅,𝑔,𝑡+𝛽4𝐷𝐼𝑅,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑇,𝑔,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑃,𝑔,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Note: Where the dependent (stochastic) variable is the DYi,t and represents either the bond yield returns 
or the stock index returns of the (i) country during the time (t), and the rating changes of all the five 
countries under extensive recession. Moreover, the independent variable are the, DYi,t-1  which is one lag 
                                                          
25 Where (i) represents the countries and (j) represents the two time series (bond yield returns, stock price index 
returns). 
26 http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/rc/workshops/cumulative_returns.htm 
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of the  DYi,t variable and the Di,g,t   variables which are dummy variables targeting to represent the event of 
the (i) country under investigation to have a credit rate change, of (g) direction, during the (t) day.  
 
The dummy variable, of which (g) parameter represents an upgrade it takes the price zero, 
for the absence of an event and the price one for one day before the day of the event, the actual 
day and one day after, of the upgrade, for the dummy variables of which (g) parameter 
represents a downgrade they take the price zero for the absence of an event and minus one for 
one day before the day of the event, the actual day and one day after the actual downgrade.  
We are running the regression for the period (2000 – 2015) and for the three 
aforementioned sub – periods (pre – crisis, during – crisis, post-crisis). We expect that, if the 
credit rating changes are considered as an information transfer, then we should observe a 
statistically significant relation between the dummy variables and the dependent variable. We 
should underline that, we tried to estimate the same regression in a pair manner to be sure that 
the results will not differ comparing to the overall regression, yet we obtained the same results 
and for the sake of space we will present just the latter one. The same holds both for the bond 
and the stock market. 
 
6. Results  
The Table 1 describes the mean reaction of the bond market participants (Panel A) and the 
stock market participants (Panel B). As we observe normally when we have an upgrade event 
neither the bond, nor the stock market presents with a statistical significant reaction. This could 
be translated as the expected efficiency of the market, since it seems that the information which 
lead the CRA’s to upgrade the countries’ creditworthiness is already known to the investors and 
market participants. Regarding the downgrades we observe a week indication for the Portugal at 
the 10% level of significance for the bond market and strong indication for the stock market at 
the 5% level of significance. The same hold also for Greece which presents with a strong mean 
reaction for both the bond and stock markets. The direction of the reactions are on the expected 
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side since when a downgrade occurs the yield of the Greek and Portugal bonds is increasing and 
the equity return of the country’s benchmark index is decreasing. 
The Average Cumulative Return which records the response of the markets after 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 10 days and the respective t – statistic, are reported in tables 2 and 3. As one can notice, the 
results are mixed, changing from country to country, both for the bond and the stock market. 
Regarding the upgrades, the response of the bond market concerning Greece presents a 
statistical significant response to the rating change for the first and second day following the 
event. Italy present a significant but slightly positive response for the third and fifth day after the 
event, Ireland reacts significant in the ten days horizon and Spain for the fourth and fifth. All of 
them in the expected direction. The bond market response to downgrades, more intensively, 
with the Portugal to react for ten days in a statistically significant manner, demonstrating that 
the downgrade produces a negative information which escalates during the next days, Ireland 
presents a response for the first day and Greece and Spain during the last days.  
For the Equity market the findings which should be underlined are the response of the Spain 
to the upgrades, which is incorporating them for four days, and the Ireland’s five day response 
to the downgrade event.  On average the response for the downgrades is more intense, as we 
expected from the findings of previous studies, which suggest that the downgrades are more 
forceful for the downgrades. However, we can say that, having on mind the severity of the crisis, 
we anticipated a more noticeable reaction. An explanation could be the continuous interest of 
the media regarding the whole financial crisis details, which was the case during the last years.  
Hence, the information was already being digested by the investors, who expected and foreseen 
the events. Moreover, the period we examine has a significant increase in the volume of the 
rating announcements and actual rating changes with the most of them to be downgrades. The 
sovereign government bonds of the stable countries, normally are considered as investment and 
not speculative tools (A. M. Ineichen, 2002). In this regard, the expected reaction of the investors 
is, to be more active in the good news of an upgrade (since it is the action of returning to the 
normal state) of a government bond than an upgrade of the corporate or non-stabile government 
bonds (which tend to be more volatile normally).  
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6.1 Information Transfer 
We next investigate the possibility of an impact to one country’s bond and stock market, 
occurred by the credit rating changes of another country’s credibility. Our analysis is 
concentrated in the tables 4 to 13 which visualize the information transfer from one country’s 
grade signal to the markets.  
Aiming to a more efficient explanation of the results we will explain them in a manner of one 
country’s impact to the other countries. 
 
6.1.1 Greece 
The country with the most rating changes of that period is Greece, with 48 rating changes 
(15 upgrades and 33 downgrades), hence it is by far the most interesting subject of the current 
examination. For the whole period (2000 – 2015) Greece seems to have a statistical significant 
impact on the bond market only for itself for the upgrade change, however it has a significant 
impact for all the countries under recession except France, for the downgrades. Regarding the 
equity market, Greece influence itself after a downgrade and the Germany equity market.  
Regarding the sub-periods, for the pre-crisis period Greece’s downgrades influence once 
again all the countries’ under recession, bond yields,  except France and influence the Greek 
equity market during an upgrade, as well as the Greek, the Portuguese and Irish equity markets 
for a downgrade. 
During the crisis period Greece’s upgrades influence the Greek bond yields, and its 
downgrades all the countries’ bond yields except France and only Greek equity market.  
During the post crisis period Greece has the difference comparing to the other countries 
that it still be into a bailout program for financial stability. During that period, in which all the 
other countries are more or less stabilized, Greece has an impact only on its own bond yield and 
only for the downgrades. 
The Impact of Credit Rating Changes on European Countries 
 
 
Page 29 / 47 
 
6.1.2 Spain  
Spain is the second most graded country during that period, with 22 rating changes (7 
upgrades and 15 downgrades). However, Spain’s impact can be found only for the pre – crisis 
period, since we discover a statistical significant impact of Spanish downgrades to France bond 
yields. We tend to believe that, the size of the Spain and the confidence of the investors that it is 
“too big to fail” prevent the contagion effect and the information transfer during the crisis and 
post- crisis period from the Spanish grades to the rest of the countries.  
 
6.1.3 Portugal 
Portugal was the second most impactful country, after Greece, according to our 
examination. Portugal was subject to 19 rating changes (3 upgrades and 16 downgrades). The 
small number of upgrades impede us to complete all the t-tests, however the clues are 
significant. Portugal during the whole period, seems to have an impact to Irish, Spanish and Italian 
yields both for the downgrades and the upgrades. Moreover for the downgrade cases Portugal 
has a statistical significant impact to its own equity market and to the Spanish index. Portugal is 
one of the countries which have a significant impact to the stable countries, since the downgrade 
of the Portuguese credibility appears that it has a statistically significant impact on the 
Switzerland yields.  During the sub – periods Portuguese downgrades presents a significant 
impact to Greek and Italian yields as well as to Irish and Portuguese yields and stock returns. 
 
6.1.4 Ireland  
The Republic of Ireland is the smaller of the countries under examination, however it has 
a significant impact on several equity and bond markets during that years. By examining the 
whole period we confront the impact of Ireland upgrades only to Greek stock exchange index. 
On the other hand, regarding the downgrades, Ireland seems to have a statistically significant 
impact on both Portuguese and Spanish bond yields. Regarding the 2000-2008 sub period Ireland 
has an impact on its own bond yields and the Italian ones during the upgrades, and only impacts 
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the Irish stock market during the downgrades. However, Ireland seem really important for the 
stock markets of Portugal and Spain during the downgrades of the post-crisis period. 
 
6.1.5 Italy 
The least graded country of the PIIGS countries during the period 2000-2015 is Italy which 
had a grade change 15 times during that era (2 upgrades and 13 downgrades). However, Italy is 
the only country which has a substantial impact on the stable countries under examination. 
During the period 2000-2015 Italian downgrades impacted statistically significant the yields of 
Austria, Switzerland and UK, as well as the German stock index. Italy is a very big country and the 
extensive downgrades, seems to rise a fear among the sovereign European countries. 
 
6.2 Final Guidance 
All the above mentioned results are presented in the Appendix section as it follows: 
 Tables 4 and 5: Period 2000-2015 Impact of PIIGS rating changes to countries under 
recession 
 Tables 6 and 7: Period 2000-2015 Impact of PIIGS rating changes to stable countries 
 Tables 8 and 9: Period 2000-2008 Impact of PIIGS rating changes to countries under 
recession 
 Tables 10 and 11: Period 2009 - 2012 Impact of PIIGS rating changes to countries under 
recession 
 Tables 12 and 13: Period 2013 -2015 Impact of PIIGS rating changes to countries under 
recession 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper is an attempt to examine the reaction of the bond and stock markets to the Credit 
Rating Agencies rating changes during the period 2000-2015. According to our findings the 
downgrades of the five countries under examination have a more significant impact compare to 
the upgrades. The most impactful country was Greece, followed by Portugal, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain. Regarding the upgrades the most important finding was that for the period 2000 – 2008 
Greece used to have a significant impact to its own stock index and for the period 2009 – 2012 
on its own yields. After that, the impact seems to disappear. Moreover we found strong evidence 
of an information transfer from downgrades, separated in three parts. First we observe an impact 
among the small and more vulnerable countries (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal), second we 
observe an impact among the neighbor countries (Portugal, Spain) and third an impact among 
the major countries (Spain, France, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, UK).  
Concluding we would like to state that the most of the times the transfer of the information 
seems to happen because of the downgrade changes, and impacts specific team of countries, 
with the three small to impact mostly their markets and the markets of the vulnerable and small 
countries and the major ones to impact the major and stable countries of our sample. 
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9. Appendix 
 
 
Table 1 
Panel A 
 
Mean Reaction of Bond Market 
 to Credit Rating Changes 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 Mean R(0) t- stat Prob. 
No of 
upgrades 
Mean 
R(0) 
t- stat Prob. 
No of 
downgrades 
Portugal -0.01189 - 0 3 0.01383** 1.818706 0.089 16 
Italy 0.00245 - 0.6669 2 0.00057 0.182754 0.8586 11 
Ireland -0.01237 -0.74133 0.4918 6 0.00356 0.767073 0.4558 15 
Greece 0.00367 0.740459 0.4713 15 0.02363* 2.27123 0.0305 32 
Spain -0.00382 -0.68937 0.5163 7 -0.00478 -0.99666 0.3347 16 
 
Panel B 
 
Mean Reaction of the Equity Market 
 to Credit Rating Changes 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 Mean R(0) t- stat Prob. 
No of 
upgrades 
Mean 
R(0) 
t- stat Prob. 
No of 
downgrades 
Portugal -0.00949 - 0 3 -0.00787* -1.93413 0.0736 16 
Italy 0.018847 - 0.3839 2 -0.00107 -0.17429 0.8648 11 
Ireland 0.003422 0.779013 0.4712 6 -0.00424 -0.68889 0.5022 15 
Greece -0.01132 -0.87683 0.3954 15 -0.0173* -2.36403 0.0245 32 
Spain -0.00928 -1.63526 0.1531 7 -0.00398 -1.31215 0.2106 16 
 
Note: The number of the observations regarding the upgrades of Portugal and Italy are very few to have 
a statistically correct calculation of the t-statistic.  
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Table 2 
 
Panel A 
Bond Market Reaction to Upgrades 
for the Period 2000-2015 
  Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain 
ACR(1) -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03* 0.00 
t-test -0.56 -1.14 0.79 -3.98 -0.70 
ACR(2) -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02* 0.00 
t-test -0.77 -0.24 0.86 -2.35 -0.70 
ACR(3) -0.01 0.00** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
t-test -1.49 -1.78 0.61 -0.62 -1.36 
ACR(4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 
t-test 0.15 -1.46 -0.18 0.01 -2.53 
ACR(5) 0.01 0.00* -0.01 0.00 -0.02* 
t-test 0.54 -5.54 -0.47 -0.02 -2.90 
ACR(10) 0.00 0.00 -0.05* 0.03 -0.02 
t-test 0.02 -0.74 -2.43 0.99 -1.11 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Bond Market Reaction to Downgrades  
for the Period 2000-2015 
  Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain 
ACR(1) 0.03* 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.00 
t-test 2.57 1.17 2.01 0.91 0.82 
ACR(2) 0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 
t-test 3.08 1.46 1.73 2.80 0.82 
ACR(3) 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.04* 0.01 
t-test 2.12 0.73 1.68 3.91 1.43 
ACR(4) 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.05* 0.02** 
t-test 2.32* 0.30 1.31 4.68 1.87 
ACR(5) 0.04* 0.00 0.02 0.05* 0.02** 
t-test 2.89 0.30 1.22 4.37 1.71 
ACR(10) 0.05* -0.01 0.01 -0.15* 0.02 
t-test 1.97 -0.72 0.51 -3.65 1.19 
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Table 3 
 
Panel A 
Equity Market Reaction to Upgrades  
for the Period 2000-2015 
  Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain 
ACR(1) 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.02** 0.01* 
t-test 1.67 0.37 1.17 5.33 2.62 
ACR(2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01* 
t-test -0.75 -1.52 -0.14 1.51 4.71 
ACR(3) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01* 
t-test -1.45 -3.02 -0.22 0.30 4.5 
ACR(4) -0.02** -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01* 
t-test -1.81 -2.08 0.14 -1.05 1.96 
ACR(5) -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
t-test -0.99 -1.40 -0.33 -0.60 1.08 
ACR(10) -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.02 
t-test -0.61 -1.26 0.35 -1.38 1.08 
 
 
Panel B 
Equity Market Reaction to Downgrades  
for the Period 2000-2015 
  Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain 
ACR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 
t-test -0.80 1.10 1.96 0.00 0.75 
ACR(2) 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 
t-test 0.74 0.59 2.05 0.59 -0.66 
ACR(3) 0.00 0.00 0.02* -0.02* 0.00 
t-test 0.64 0.21 2.55 -2.94 -0.88 
ACR(4) 0.00 0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.00 
t-test 0.63 0.66 2.53 -1.16 -0.17 
ACR(5) 0.00 0.01 0.01* -0.01 0.00 
t-test 0.01 0.49 2.09 -1.52 0.14 
ACR(10) -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 
t-test -0.61 1.10 1.44 -1.65 1.03 
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Table 4 
Panel A 
 
  
Recession Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer 
 due to an Upgrade for the Period  2000-2015  
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 
t-stat 0.74 -0.65 -1.34 -1.21 -1.09 -1.23 
DY lag1 0.0951* 0.1319* 0.1548* 0.0775* 0.0554* 0.1019* 
t-stat 6.03 8.39 9.80 4.87 3.48 6.37 
DGR -0.0197* -0.0002 0.0013 0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0010 
t-stat -5.59 -0.07 0.55 0.21 -0.72 -0.35 
DPOR -0.0103 -0.0083 -0.0097** -0.0098** -0.0114* -0.0091 
t-stat -1.31 -1.49 -1.81 -1.88 -2.30 -1.44 
DIR -0.0057 0.0000 0.0038 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0021 
t-stat -0.98 0.01 0.95 0.29 -0.27 -0.45 
DSP 0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0008 
t-stat 0.16 -0.65 -0.57 -0.57 -1.14 -0.19 
DIT -0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0002 
t-stat -0.09 0.05 0.01 0.19 -0.04 0.02 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to a Downgrade for the Period 2000-2015  
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0005** -0.0006* -0.0005* -0.0006* -0.0003 -0.0005 
t-stat -1.84 -2.02 -2.04 -2.31 -0.90 -1.57 
DY lag1 0.0732* 0.1162* 0.0538* 0.1483* 0.0880* 0.1021* 
t-stat 4.60 7.36 3.38 9.39 5.57 6.39 
DGR -0.0057* -0.0065* -0.0047* -0.0052* -0.0152* -0.0027* 
t-stat -3.67 -3.87 -3.16 -3.27 -6.46 -1.43 
DPOR -0.0012 -0.0139 -0.0040** -0.0092* -0.0051 -0.0017 
t-stat -0.49 -5.26 -1.71 -3.67 -1.38 -0.57 
DIR -0.0015 -0.0044** -0.0008 -0.0062* -0.0021 0.0010 
t-stat -0.61 -1.71 -0.35 -2.55 -0.59 0.33 
DSP -0.0007 0.0026 0.0025 0.0003 0.0056 -0.0030 
t-stat -0.29 1.02 1.09 0.13 1.57 -1.03 
DIT 0.0032 -0.0025 -0.0040 0.0039 0.0004 0.0050 
t-stat 1.14 -0.83 -1.47 1.34 0.10 1.43 
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Table 5 
Panel A 
  
Recession Countries : Equity market Information Transfer  
due to an Upgrade for the Period 2000-2015  
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.00046 -0.00017 0.000067 -1.3E-05 -0.00011 -5.6E-05 
t-stat -1.4773 -0.8561 0.2926 -0.0514 -0.4313 -0.2286 
DY lag1 0.08* 0.08* 0.05* 0.01 -0.02 -0.03* 
t-stat 4.7510 5.1584 3.3998 0.3341 -1.0356 -1.9533 
DGR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat 1.4757 -0.9060 0.4471 -0.0086 0.2828 0.2575 
DPOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat 0.1054 0.5373 0.1883 0.5121 0.0598 -0.2464 
DIR -0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat -2.2301 -0.9614 0.3726 -0.7099 -0.9401 -0.7399 
DSP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat -0.4867 -0.0105 -0.9260 -0.3237 -0.4029 -0.2669 
DIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
t-stat -0.2923 0.3931 -0.7532 0.4996 0.9278 0.9097 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries : Equity Market Information Transfer 
due to a Downgrade for the Period 2000-2015 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
t-stat -1.30 -0.63 0.34 0.27 -0.43 0.10 
DY lag1 0.0756* 0.0824* 0.0540* 0.0042 -0.0166 -0.0321* 
t-stat 4.73 5.13 3.38 0.26 -1.04 -2.00 
DGR 0.0034** 0.0017 0.0011 0.0024 0.0007 0.0024 
t-stat 1.75 1.39 0.78 1.60 0.28 1.60 
DPOR 0.0025 0.0052* 0.0021 0.0043** 0.0003 0.0025 
t-stat 0.82 2.74 0.93 1.78 0.06 1.06 
DIR 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0036 0.0008 
t-stat 0.05 -0.70 -0.73 -0.10 -0.94 0.35 
DSP -0.0045 0.0000 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0016 
t-stat -1.54 -0.01 0.46 0.13 -0.40 0.68 
DIT 0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0033 -0.0021 0.0059 -0.0033 
t-stat 0.3661 -0.8960 -1.2568 -0.7377 0.9278 -1.1767 
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Table 6 
Panel A 
  
Stable Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to an Upgrade for the Period 2000-2015  
  Austria Germany Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK 
c -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0170 -0.0003 
t-stat -1.06 -0.84 -1.26 -1.12 0.93 -0.94 
DY lag1 0.1670* 0.1555* 0.1205* 0.1525* -0.0168 0.0063 
t-stat 10.51 9.75 7.59 9.48 -1.05 0.39 
DGR -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0154 0.0021 
t-stat -0.40 -0.16 0.07 0.09 -0.09 0.83 
DPOR -0.0058 -0.0078 -0.0079 -0.0039 -0.0249 0.0011 
t-stat -0.81 -0.79 -1.05 -0.52 -0.07 0.19 
DIR -0.0043 -0.0057 -0.0035 -0.0024 -0.3613 -0.0020 
t-stat -0.79 -0.77 -0.63 -0.41 -1.27 -0.49 
DSP -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0211 -0.0017 
t-stat -0.22 -0.15 -0.28 -0.21 -0.08 -0.44 
DIT 0.0004 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0141 -0.0015 
t-stat 0.05 0.03 0.12 -0.08 -0.03 -0.23 
 
Panel B 
  
Stable Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to a Downgrade for the Period 2000-2015  
  Austria Germany Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK 
c -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0155 -0.0002 
t-stat -1.27 -0.90 -1.35 -0.91 0.83 -0.67 
DY lag1 0.1670* 0.1561* 0.1214* 0.1534* -0.0167 0.0055 
t-stat 10.53 9.80 7.66 9.56 -1.05 0.34 
DGR -0.0014 0.0011 -0.0012 0.0010 -0.0427 -0.0002 
t-stat -0.65 0.37 -0.53 0.43 -0.37 -0.14 
DPOR -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0062** 0.0007 -0.0002 
t-stat -0.92 -0.39 -0.10 1.69 0.00 -0.08 
DIR 0.0013 0.0017 0.0009 0.0036 0.0141 0.0022 
t-stat 0.41 0.38 0.26 1.04 0.08 0.84 
DSP -0.0028 -0.0051 -0.0026 -0.0086 -0.0258 -0.0006 
t-stat -0.86 -1.12 -0.75 -2.45 -0.15 -0.22 
DIT 0.0070** 0.0072 0.0059 0.0083* 0.1746 0.0064* 
t-stat 1.77 1.30 1.43 2.00 0.83 2.06 
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Table 7 
Panel A 
  
Stable Countries : Equity Market Information Transfer 
due to an Upgrade for the Period 2000-2015  
  Austria Germany Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK 
c 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
t-stat 0.87 0.33 -0.41 0.21 0.31 0.13 
DY lag1 0.0699* -0.0113 -0.0079 -0.0265** 0.0331* -0.0510* 
t-stat 4.35 -0.71 -0.49 -1.65 2.06 -3.16 
DGR 0.0005 0.0013 0.0007 0.0012 0.0003 -0.0007 
t-stat 0.21 0.55 0.29 0.49 0.18 -0.35 
DPOR -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0017 
t-stat -0.53 -0.57 -0.20 0.05 -0.09 -0.41 
DIR -0.0045 -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0021 
t-stat -1.15 -0.51 -0.61 -0.63 -0.44 -0.68 
DSP 0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0009 
t-stat 0.31 -0.50 -0.72 -0.48 -0.18 -0.33 
DIT -0.0042 0.0010 0.0048 0.0009 0.0036 -0.0011 
t-stat -0.71 0.15 0.79 0.14 0.73 -0.22 
 
Panel B 
  
Stable Countries : Equity Market Information Transfer 
due to a Downgrade for the Period 2000-2015   
  Austria Germany Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK 
c 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
t-stat 1.08 0.49 -0.22 0.21 0.62 0.22 
DY lag1 0.0697* -0.0122 -0.0085 -0.0265** 0.0321* -0.0520* 
t-stat 4.34 -0.77 -0.53 -1.65 2.00 -3.22 
DGR 0.0021 0.0026** 0.0024 0.0012 0.0016 0.0027 
t-stat 1.43 1.69 1.60 0.49 1.29 2.17 
DPOR 0.0012 0.0014 0.0012 0.0002 0.0014 0.0000 
t-stat 0.52 0.57 0.53 0.05 0.74 0.02 
DIR -0.0002 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0025 0.0012 0.0001 
t-stat -0.08 0.29 0.20 -0.63 0.64 0.06 
DSP 0.0013 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0017 0.0002 
t-stat 0.59 0.32 0.16 -0.48 0.93 0.10 
DIT -0.0006 -0.0051** -0.0030 0.0009 -0.0030 -0.0025 
t-stat -0.23 -1.81 -1.09 0.14 -1.33 -1.09 
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Table 8 
Panel A 
  
Recession Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to a Upgrade for the Period 2000-2008 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
t-stat -0.16 -0.31 -0.21 -0.54 -0.60 -0.73 
DY lag1 0.0908 0.0251 0.0719 0.0215 0.0449 0.0160 
t-stat 4.55 1.26 3.62 1.07 2.24 0.80 
DGR -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0019 
t-stat -0.87 -0.66 -0.79 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 
DPOR - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DIR - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DSP -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0012 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0006 
t-stat -0.21 -0.43 -0.35 0.13 -0.41 -0.19 
DIT -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0001 
t-stat -0.14 0.06 -0.09 0.27 -0.02 -0.03 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to a Downgrade for the Period 2000-2008 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
t-stat -0.90 -0.89 -0.91 -0.92 -1.02 -0.96 
DY lag1 0.0795 0.0160 0.0573 0.0159 0.0398 0.0107 
t-stat 3.99 0.81 2.88 0.79 1.98 0.53 
DGR -0.0110 -0.0077 -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0036 -0.0026 
t-stat -5.22 -3.46 -2.89 -2.99 -1.82 -1.18 
DPOR -0.0104 -0.0119 -0.0207 -0.0049 -0.0077 -0.0068 
t-stat -2.63 -2.85 -4.97 -1.24 -2.08 -1.64 
DIR 0.0000 -0.0024 -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0017 
t-stat 0.01 -0.89 -1.22 -0.53 -0.85 -0.63 
DSP -0.0010 0.0084 0.0031 0.0084 0.0053 0.0161 
t-stat -0.18 1.46 0.53 1.53 1.03 2.79 
DIT -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0034 
t-stat -0.66 -0.55 -0.57 -0.62 -0.85 -0.59 
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Table 9 
Panel A 
  
Recession Countries : Equity Market Information Transfer  
due to a Upgrade for the Period 2000-2008 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c 0.0015 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 
t-stat 1.39 0.52 -0.09 0.23 -0.06 -1.20 
DY lag1 0.0532** 0.2039* 0.2291* 0.1894* 0.1348* 0.0822* 
t-stat 1.74 6.61 7.49 6.10 4.32 2.61 
DGR -0.0903* 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0066 0.0010 
t-stat -8.08 0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -1.21 0.18 
DPOR - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DIR 0.0007 -0.0068 0.0229* 0.0095 0.0175** 0.0043 
t-stat 0.04 -0.54 2.27 0.92 1.87 0.45 
DSP - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DIT - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries :Equity Market Information Transfer  
due to a Downgrade for the Period 2000-2008 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0006 
t-stat -0.37 -1.00 -1.30 -0.10 -0.43 -1.11 
DY lag1 0.0529** 0.1721* 0.2168* 0.1851* 0.1327* 0.0821* 
t-stat 1.69 5.53 7.08 5.94 4.23 2.60 
DGR -0.0152* -0.0049* -0.0040* -0.0024 -0.0014 0.0014 
t-stat -3.76 -1.93 -1.92 -1.12 -0.74 0.73 
DPOR -0.0049 -0.0140* -0.0097* -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0028 
t-stat -0.87 -3.92 -3.35 -0.41 -1.04 -1.00 
DIR -0.0038 -0.0051 -0.0052** -0.0017 -0.0003 0.0008 
t-stat -0.69 -1.50 -1.87 -0.57 -0.12 0.29 
DSP 0.0070 0.0035 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0036 
t-stat 1.29 1.03 0.10 -0.28 0.10 -1.36 
DIT -0.0049 -0.0082 0.0025 0.0043 0.0001 0.0061 
t-stat -0.59 -1.61 0.60 1.01 0.01 1.54 
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Table 10 
Panel A 
  
Recession Countries :Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to a Upgrade for the Period 2009-2012 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0005 -0.0016* -0.0018* -0.0012 -0.0015* -0.0010 
t-stat -0.42 -2.00 -2.28 -1.46 -1.93 -0.94 
DY lag1 0.0955* 0.1322* 0.1285* 0.0519 0.0266 0.1344* 
t-stat 2.98 4.10 3.94 1.59 0.81 4.10 
DGR -0.0280* 0.0019 0.0043 0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0001 
t-stat -3.89 0.42 0.96 0.57 -0.13 -0.02 
DPOR -0.0094 -0.0069 -0.0088 -0.0091 -0.0092 -0.0076 
t-stat -0.73 -0.84 -1.08 -1.12 -1.17 -0.70 
DIR -0.0067 0.0033 0.0004 0.0001 0.0016 -0.0028 
t-stat -0.62 0.48 0.06 0.01 0.24 -0.31 
DSP 0.0050 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0031 -0.0006 
t-stat 0.45 -0.34 -0.32 -0.51 -0.46 -0.06 
DIT - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries :Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to a Downgrade for the Period 2009-2012 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0023** -0.0021* -0.0020* -0.0014** -0.0019* -0.0013 
t-stat -1.82 -2.57 -2.52 -1.76 -2.38 -1.18 
DY lag1 0.0833* 0.1227* 0.1224* 0.0475 0.0251 0.1314* 
t-stat 2.60 3.79 3.74 1.45 0.77 4.01 
DGR -0.0301* -0.0115* -0.0076* -0.0082* -0.0065** -0.0075 
t-stat -4.98 -2.98 -1.99 -2.13 -1.76 -1.45 
DPOR -0.0070 0.0036 -0.0031 -0.0026 0.0082 -0.0010 
t-stat -0.35 0.28 -0.24 -0.20 0.66 -0.06 
DIR 0.0271 0.0115 -0.0252 0.0140 0.0053 0.0039 
t-stat 1.00 0.67 -1.48 0.82 0.32 0.17 
DSP 0.0022 -0.0017 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0063 
t-stat 0.22 -0.26 0.00 -0.24 -0.26 -0.74 
DIT 0.0047 -0.0047 0.0045 0.0039 -0.0022 0.0107 
t-stat 0.47 -0.73 0.71 0.60 -0.35 1.25 
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Table 11 
Panel A 
  
Recession Countries :Stock Market Information Transfer  
due to an Upgrade for the Period 2009-2012 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 
t-stat -1.08 -0.70 -0.55 -0.03 -0.74 -0.74 
DY lag1 0.1022* 0.0610* 0.0657* -0.0307 -0.0136 -0.0471* 
t-stat 5.12 3.00 3.28 -1.52 -0.68 -2.34 
DGR 0.0027 -0.0006 0.0014 0.0029 0.0021 0.0030 
t-stat 0.66 -0.20 0.35 0.73 0.55 0.73 
DPOR - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DIR - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DSP -0.0019 0.0007 -0.0046 -0.0019 -0.0034 -0.0020 
t-stat -0.36 0.20 -0.90 -0.37 -0.70 -0.38 
DIT -0.0024 0.0020 -0.0041 0.0032 0.0060 0.0058 
t-stat -0.37 0.44 -0.66 0.52 0.99 0.91 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries :Stock Market Information Transfer  
due to an Downgrade for the Period 2009-2012 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
t-stat -0.96 -0.60 -0.66 0.18 -0.46 -0.44 
DY lag1 0.1005* 0.0602* 0.0639* -0.0336** -0.0164 -0.0492* 
t-stat 5.03 2.96 3.18 -1.66 -0.81 -2.44 
DGR 0.0088* 0.0023 0.0028 0.0034 0.0047 0.0048 
t-stat 2.54 0.92 0.82 1.02 1.43 1.38 
DPOR -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
t-stat -0.83 0.92 0.29 1.15 1.57 1.08 
DIR 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat -0.99 -1.19 -1.50 -0.53 -0.44 -0.18 
DSP 0.0072 0.0078 -0.0027 0.0137 0.0116 0.0106 
t-stat 0.80 1.20 -0.31 1.58 1.37 1.17 
DIT -0.0075 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0079 -0.0029 -0.0048 
t-stat -0.83 -0.22 -0.02 -0.91 -0.34 -0.53 
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Table 12 
Panel A 
  
Recession Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to an Upgrade for the Period 2013 -2015 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 
t-stat -0.78 -0.22 0.83 -0.10 -0.16 0.36 
DY lag1 0.0324 0.0724* 0.0260 0.0738* 0.0336 0.0129 
t-stat 1.03 2.28 0.82 2.33 1.06 0.41 
DGR 0.0006 0.0016 0.0010 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 
t-stat 0.08 0.36 0.19 -0.03 0.06 0.27 
DPOR - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DIR -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
t-stat -1.19 -1.50 -0.49 -0.89 -0.35 -1.16 
DSP - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
DIT - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries : Bond Market Information Transfer  
due to an Upgrade for the Period 2013-2015 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c -0.0003 0.0002 0.0006 0.0003 0.0001 0.0006 
t-stat -0.41 0.48 1.13 0.49 0.22 1.05 
DY lag1 0.0292 0.0720* 0.0300 0.0735* 0.0326 0.0108 
t-stat 0.92 2.27 0.95 2.32 1.03 0.34 
DGR 0.0046** 0.0019 0.0014 0.0023 0.0020 0.0025 
t-stat 1.72 1.25 0.79 1.13 0.92 1.32 
DPOR 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat 0.67 2.44 0.97 1.48 1.35 1.06 
DIR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat 0.46 -0.06 -0.28 0.32 0.30 0.62 
DSP -0.0052 0.0000 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0017 
t-stat -1.42 0.00 0.55 -0.02 -0.42 0.67 
DIT 0.0026 -0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0022 
t-stat 0.48 -0.27 -0.83 -0.04 -0.62 -0.59 
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Table 13 
Panel A 
  
Recession Countries : Stock Market Information Transfer  
due to an Upgrade for the Period 2013 -2015 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008* 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 
t-stat 0.24 0.27 2.38 0.59 1.15 1.49 
DY lag1 0.0698* 0.1287* 0.0582* 0.0388 -0.0697* -0.0485 
t-stat 2.11 3.95 1.79 1.19 -2.13 -1.48 
DGR 0.0047 -0.0023 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0013 
t-stat 0.96 -0.94 0.01 -0.65 -0.33 -0.56 
DPOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat 0.00 0.49 0.04 0.54 -0.17 -0.50 
DIR -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat -1.48 -0.33 0.63 -0.38 -1.02 -0.51 
DSP -0.0030 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 
t-stat -0.41 -0.22 -0.65 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 
DIT - - - - - - 
t-stat - - - - - - 
 
Panel B 
  
Recession Countries : Stock Market Information Transfer  
due to an Downgrade for the Period 2013 -2015 
  Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Italy France 
c 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 0.0005 0.0006 
t-stat 0.05 0.17 2.37 0.51 0.97 1.40 
DY lag1 0.0672* 0.1288* 0.0559** 0.0350 -0.0704* -0.0465 
t-stat 2.03 3.96 1.72 1.07 -2.16 -1.42 
DGR 0.0033 0.0011 0.0011 0.0027 0.0025 0.0020 
t-stat 0.80 0.56 0.68 1.23 1.01 1.08 
DPOR 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat 0.18 0.26 1.04 0.68 0.23 0.69 
DIR -0.03 -0.02** -0.01 -0.02** 0.00 0.00 
t-stat -1.61 -1.94 -1.42 -1.81 -0.44 -0.37 
DSP -0.0070 0.0019 0.0001 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0016 
t-stat -1.07 0.54 0.04 -1.27 -1.18 -0.51 
DIT 0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0027 0.0020 0.0016 -0.0010 
t-stat 0.11 -0.46 -1.01 0.54 0.39 -0.32 
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Table 14 
Investment Grade 
Fitch Moody's S&P Interpretation Numeric Scale 
AAA Aaa AAA Very high credit quality 1 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
High credit quality 
2 
AA Aa2 AA 3 
AA- Aa3 AA- 4 
A+ A1 A+ 
Medium - high grade, 
with low credit risk 
5 
A A2 A 6 
A- A3 A- 7 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
Moderate credit rick 
8 
BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 10 
 
 
Note: The rating categories used by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s for long term debt are presented in table. 
Source: Nogueira Freitas A, Fonseca Minardi A. (2013) The Impact of Credit Rating Changes in Latin American Stock 
Markets. BAR - Brazilian Administration Review, 439-461 
Speculative Grade 
Fitch Moody's S&P Interpretation Numeric Scale 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
It has speculative elements and it is subject to 
substantial credit risk 
11 
BB+ Ba2 BB+ 12 
BB- Ba3 BB- 13 
B+ B1 B+ 
It is considered speculative and it has high  credit 
risk 
14 
B B2 B 15 
B- B3 B- 16 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
Bad credit conditions and it is subject to high 
credit risk 
17 
CCC Caa2 CCC 18 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 19 
CC Ca CC 20 
C C C 
Very close  
to default or in default 
22 
DDD - SD 22 
DDD  D 22 
DDD  - 22 
